Employment Protection and Incentives: Severance Pay vs. Procedural Inconvenience by EGUCHI Kyota & 江口 匡太
Employment Protection and Incentives:
Severance Pay vs. Procedural Inconvenience
著者 EGUCHI Kyota
year 2011-09
シリーズ Department of Social Systems and Management
Discussion Paper Series;no.1280
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2241/115340
  
Department of Social Systems and Management 
Discussion Paper Series 
 
 
No.1280 
 
Employment Protection and Incentives: 
Severance Pay vs. Procedural Inconvenience 
 
by 
Kyota EGUCHI 
 
September 2011 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF TSUKUBA 
Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8573 
JAPAN 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
Employment Protection and Incentives: 
Severance Pay vs. Procedural Inconvenience * 
 
 
 
Kyota Eguchi** 
 
University of Tsukuba 
Department of Social Systems and Management 
 
 
 
 
 
May 2011 
2011/05/23 
 
 
                                                  
* I am grateful to Ryo Kambayashi, Ryoichi Imai, Masaru Sasaki, Hideshi Itoh, Takashi Shimizu, 
and the seminar participants at the Search Theory Workshop, the Law and Economics Workshop, 
Tohoku University, Nihon University, the Contract Theory Workshop, Nanzan University, and 
Tokei-kenkyu-kai. This research was partially supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research 
from the Japanese Ministry of Education, and the Japan Securities Scholarship Foundation. Any 
error, if present, is entirely mine. 
JEL Classification Numbers: J64, J65, K31 
** Correspondence: Kyota Eguchi, University of Tsukuba, Department of Social Systems and 
Management, 1-1-1, Tennou-dai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8573, Japan.  
e-mail: eguchi@sk.tsukuba.ac.jp 
2 
 
  
 
 
Employment Protection and Incentives:  
Severance Pay vs. Procedural Inconvenience 
 
Abstract 
I consider the effects of employment protection (EP) on workers’ incentives and the 
labor market with search friction. EP is categorized into severance pay and procedural 
inconvenience. Severance pay is merely a transfer of money from firms to dismissed 
employees, while procedural inconvenience yields a wasteful cost. This difference is 
crucial to workers’ incentives because severance pay is a benefit for shirking employees. 
Although it appears to negatively affect workers’ incentives, EP, particularly procedural 
inconvenience, has a positive effect on incentives if EP is not severe. An optimal 
balance exists between severance pay and procedural inconvenience. 
 
JEL Classification Numbers: J64, J65, K31 
Key words: Employment protection, Incentives, Commitment, and Efficiency wage.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In general, it is believed that an employment protection (EP) policy is a major 
cause for the poor performance of labor markets in European countries; however, the 
vast literature on EP has shown conflicting results regarding crucial factors such as 
unemployment rates and social welfare. The ambiguous results can be applied to verify 
the effect of EP on incentives of workers.  
EP is often assumed to negatively affect workers’ incentives. A leading theory, 
the efficiency wage model, holds that the threat of dismissal is a driving force in 
workers’ incentives. If shirking workers are unlikely to be fired because of EP 
provisions, EP has a disincentive effect. However, EP can have a positive effect on 
workers’ incentives. Even if a worker works hard, his/her performance or the state of 
affairs of his/her firm may be very poor in uncertain situations, resulting in doubts 
regarding the firm’s ability to maintain the employer-employee relationship. When 
workers who make credible efforts are easily fired because of bad business conditions, 
they realize that they cannot recover the cost of their efforts; thus, they are discouraged. 
Because a firm’s decision regarding the dismissal of an employee tends to be based on 
ex post optimization, credible job security should be provided in such conditions. A 
significant function of EP is that it serves as a commitment device for job security. Thus, 
it has a commitment effect. The objective of this paper is to consider the effects of EP on 
the incentives of workers and the labor market with search friction and to show whether 
the commitment effect overrides the disincentive effect. 
While the disincentive effect of EP has often prevailed, the commitment effect 
has generally not been given serious consideration, except in some recent studies 
regarding skill formation. Suedekum and Ruehmann (2003) and Belot, Boone, and van 
Ours (2007) indicate that the introduction of severance pay (SP) as a type of EP 
encourages workers to make a human investment, because SP gives workers some of 
the rent that drives skill formation. Booth and Zoega (2003) suggest that firing policies 
tend to be excessively implemented because firms are not concerned about the human 
capital lost when workers quit and move to another industry.1  
Although previous studies generated insightful results, they are limited to 
partial equilibrium models. They, therefore, exclude the effects of EP on firms’ entry 
level in terms of the general equilibrium. As a recent study by Demougin and Helm 
                                                  
1 Some studies show that unions function as commitment devices: Booth and Chatterji (1998) show 
that unions’ bargaining power enhances skill formation and improves social welfare; Eguchi (2002) 
also points out the significance of unions as commitment devices for job security. Piccirilli (2010) 
analyzes the effect of employment protection when unions can commit future wages. 
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(2011) analyzed an incentive problem from the perspective of the search model, I focus 
on incentive problems of workers rather than on skill formation. I consider, from the 
viewpoint of the general equilibrium, the effects of EP on the incentives of workers and 
labor markets with search friction, in particular, wage level, likelihood of firing, 
employment, unemployment rate, inflows and outflows of unemployment, and social 
welfare. Furthermore, my infinitely long-term model enables the analysis of EP’s 
effects under short- or long-term economic shocks. 
In the literature on EP, EP has been treated as a firing cost that firms incur 
upon firing workers. In this paper, firing costs are categorized into SP and procedural 
inconvenience (PI). Both increase the cost of firing for firms; thus, some studies 
consider SP as a firing cost, while others investigate PI. Although the effects of SP and 
PI have probably been separately investigated, I compare the effect of SP along with PI 
and show an optimal balance between SP and PI. SP is merely the transfer of money 
from a firm to a fired employee, while PI, for example, providing sufficient advance 
notice or negotiations with a union, leads to a transaction cost. It seems that SP is better 
than PI, but SP can be a benefit for a shirking employee and may damage workers’ 
incentives. This difference is significant. 
Punishment schemes for shirking employees are critical with regard to their 
incentives. In the context of EP, one crucial issue is whether shirking employees are 
eligible for SP. Dismissals are therefore categorized into two types of cases: in the case 
of redundancy, when firms fire workers because of bad financial health, the workers are 
eligible; in the case where disciplinary action is taken and workers are fired on the 
grounds of poor performance or unprofessional conduct, they are not eligible.  
When EP provides benefits only for diligent employees in the case of 
redundancy, it is unlikely to cause a negative effect on workers’ incentives because only 
diligent employees are protected, the shirking ones are not. In this case, if monitoring 
devices work effectively, the negative effect of EP on incentives is unlikely to appear. 
Thus, Boeri and Jimeno (2005) indicate that EP can be exempted for small companies 
when shirkers can be easily identified in small companies. Fella (2000) compares SP 
with PI by using the efficiency wage model with a monitoring device and shows that SP 
generates a positive effect when the monitoring device effectively functions.  
My purpose, however, is to consider a situation in which no monitoring device 
is available and all fired employees receive SP. In this situation, EP is expected to be 
the cause of employee moral hazard; however, it will be shown that EP can generate a 
positive impact on employee incentives and the economy through the commitment 
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effect.2 According to my computer simulation, the negative effect of SP is apparent 
when SP is not low. The impact of PI is not significant when SP is low or high. 
However, when SP is in the middle range, PI intensifies the commitment effect, 
encourages workers to work hard, and improves social welfare. If credible job security 
is provided to an employee through PI, a firm can lower wages in exchange for high job 
security, thus reducing the cost of retaining an employee. When PI is moderately severe, 
it boosts market tightness and reduces the unemployment rate. The positive effect of PI 
appears when SP is in the middle range; thus, an optimal balance exists between SP and 
PI. 
The result of numerical illustration indicates that an extensive relaxation in the 
provisions of EP as well as very severe EP reduces employees’ incentives. This result is 
also similar with those of studies that accept the positive effect of a firing tax without 
explicit concerns regarding employee incentives, such as Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) 
(2007), Rogerson and Schindler (2002), Pissarides (2001), and Blanchard and Tirole 
(2008).  
 This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a Mortensen–Pissarides 
matching model with an incentive problem and considers the effects of SP and PI as EP 
categories. I also conduct a computer simulation in Section 3 to investigate the effects 
of SP and PI. Finally, Section 4 presents the conclusions. 
 
 
2. The Model 
 
1. Employment contract 
 A firm with a job vacancy is randomly matched to an unemployed worker in 
the labor market. After matching, the employed worker is required to make an effort to 
achieve high productivity, and the effort cost c is borne by the employee. Productivity p 
of an employee who makes an effort is stochastically determined to be [0 , ]p p . The 
density and distribution functions are denoted as ( )p  and ( )p , respectively. In the 
                                                  
2 Galdon-Sanchez and Guell (2003) also focus on the situation in which the court is unable to 
distinguish between the cases of redundancy and disciplinary action. In their model, firms allege that 
workers have been fired for disciplinary reasons even if the opposite is true. Hence, the fired workers 
do not receive SP because of the firms’ moral hazards. In the situation where firms’ moral hazard 
regarding firings is pervasive, some regulations that inhibit firms from easily firing employees are 
likely to provide positive effects on the economy. In contrast, I consider a situation in which the 
court makes no distinction between cases of redundancy and disciplinary dismissal and I focus on 
the employee moral hazard. Firms have to pay SP to all fired employees, including shirking 
employees. 
6 
 
case of a shirking employee, the density and distribution functions are similarly denoted 
by ( )S p  and ( )S p , respectively. The effort cost of a shirking employee is zero. It 
is assumed that the first-order stochastic dominance holds, i.e., ( ) ( )Sp p    for 
[0 , ]p p , with strict inequality for a set of values of p with possible probability.  
 A wage is specified when a firm is matched to a worker. The wage is not 
conditional on either the worker’s behavior or on his/her productivity p, and the wage 
cannot be changed once it is specified. This setting is identical to the Shapiro and 
Stiglitz (1984) efficiency wage model.  
 The chronology of the actions of a worker and a firm is as follows: 
[1] When a firm is matched to a worker in the labor market, wage w is specified.  
[2] The worker chooses whether or not to make an effort.  
[3] Productivity [0 , ]p p  of the worker is observed. 
[4] The firm makes a decision regarding the dismissal after the revelation of 
productivity p. If an employee is fired, he/she receives SP, is transferred to the 
unemployment pool, and gets reservation wage w . The firm firing the employee posts 
a job vacancy in the labor market. On the other hand, if a worker retains employment in 
the firm, he/she produces output of value p and receives wage w. 
[5] In the next period, the fired worker and the firm that dissolved the match search for a 
new job match in the labor market. On the other hand, if both the employee and the firm 
that maintain the match repeat the same process: a new wage is specified, the employee 
chooses whether or not to make an effort, and then the value of his/her productivity is 
stochastically determined. Each period’s productivity is independent of past periods. 
 
2. Employment protection  
When a firm fires an employee, the firm bears firing cost f. After p is revealed, 
the firm’s current profit is either p w  if the firm maintains the match or f  if the 
firm fires the employee.  
Firing cost f borne by the firm consists of two factors, s and z, given as 
f s z  , where s denotes a monetary transfer such as SP, and z denotes PI such as 
administrative costs for notification and certification or negotiation with unions. PI is a 
socially wasteful transaction cost. SP is always given to all fired employees, including 
shirkers. SP and PI are social rules and are exogenously determined by the government.3 
                                                  
3 Although SP is a lump-sum transfer, studies have been conducted on the effect of SP proportional 
to wages. Staffolani (2002) analyzes SP related to wages in the Shapiro–Stiglitz efficiency wage 
model and shows that increase in SP is likely to increase employment when increase in SP reduces 
wages. Goerke (2006) compares a lump-sum type of SP with an earnings-related type of SP 
regarding employment levels and points out that a lump-sum type of SP has a larger effect on 
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3. Matching technology 
The Mortensen-Pissarides-type matching function is given by ( , )m m u v , 
where u is the unemployment rate and v is the vacancy rate, denoted as the number of 
vacant jobs as a fraction of the labor force. The vacancy-unemployment ratio v/u or v-u 
ratio, indicating market tightness, is denoted as  . The matching function is assumed to 
be a constant return to scale, that is, ( ) , 1uq m
v
      , where ( )q   denotes the 
probability with which a job vacancy will be matched to an unemployed worker. 
Clearly, '( ) 0q   . Similarly, the probability with which the unemployed worker will 
be matched to a job vacancy is given by ( )q  . 
 In the labor market, all unemployed workers are considered identical regardless 
of their past behaviors, because their past behaviors are not noted. Hence, the matching 
probability is equivalent among the unemployed. Similarly, all job vacancies in the 
market are identical for the unemployed. 
 
4. Incentive compatibility 
As I show later, an employee is fired in the case of ˆ[0 , )p p , where 
threshold pˆ  is endogenously determined. A diligent worker who makes an effort is 
fired with probability ˆ( )p . If a diligent worker is fired for low productivity, he/she 
receives SP from his/her firm and is transferred to the unemployment pool. His/her 
expected current payoff is given by ˆ ˆ( )( ) (1 ( ))p s w p w c     .  
If an employee shirks work, he/she is fired with probability ˆ( )S p . The 
expected current payoff of a shirking employee is ˆ ˆ( )( ) (1 ( ))S Sp s w p w    . 
Because the court cannot distinguish between a diligent employee and a shirking one, 
firms have to pay SP even to shirking employees. No monitoring technology is 
available to firms. 
 The present discounted value of the payoff of a diligent or shirking employee is 
denoted as EN or ES, respectively. I apply a discrete-time model; thus, the present 
discounted value of a diligent employee’s payoff is given as 
 
  1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )( ) (1 ( )) ( ) (1 ( ))
1
NE p s w p w c p U p E
r
          ,      ...(1) 
 
where max{ , }N SE E E , r is the time preference rate, and U is the present discounted 
                                                                                                                                                  
increasing employment levels than an earnings-related type. 
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value of the payoff to the unemployed. Similarly, the present discounted value of a 
shirking employee’s payoff is given by 
 
  1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )( ) (1 ( )) ( ) (1 ( ))1S S S S SE p s w p w p U p Er         .     ...(2) 
 
Finally, the present discounted value of the unemployed is given as 
 
  1 ( ) (1 ( ))
1
U w q E q U
r
       .                             ...(3) 
 
where the reservation wage for the unemployed w  indicates the value of leisure.  
Incentive compatibility (IC) and individual rationality (IR) are given by 
N SE E  and E U , respectively. Wage w should be more than reservation wage w ; 
otherwise, no worker would be willing to search for a new job. It holds from w w  
that SE U , because a shirker receives a higher wage w or reservation wage w  with 
s upon being fired. This indicates that E U  always holds and IR is slack, provided 
N SE E  holds. Therefore, it is sufficient to focus on the constraint N SE E . The 
following condition is introduced on the basis of N SE E  and E U : 
 
 
( ( ) 1)( ) ( ( )) ˆ ˆ( ) ( ( ) ( ))
ˆ( ) ( )
S
S
r q w w r q sIC w p p c
r q p
                 .     ...(4) 
 
If constraint (4) is satisfied, IC and IR hold. Because a firm is willing to minimize the 
wage, constraint (4) is binding at the equilibrium. 
 
5. Dismissal  
 The present discounted value J of a firm matched to a worker is as follows: 
 
  
ˆ
1ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ( ))
1
p
p
J p f p w p dp p V p J
r
         .          
 
The present discounted value V of a job vacancy is  1 ( ) (1 ( ))
1
V k q J q V
r
       , 
where k is the job vacancy cost. From the free entry and exit condition on job vacancies, 
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0V  . Hence, I obtain (1 )
( )
r kJ
q
  . Further, J  is defined as 1
JJ
r
 
 ; thus,  
 
  ˆ1 ˆ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ( ) ( )pp kJ p w p dp p fr p q         .                ...(5) 
 
If a firm fires an employee, the present discounted profit is –f, given that V = 0. On the 
other hand, if the firm maintains the match, the present discounted profit is given by 
( )
kp w
q
   . Hence, the threshold is given by 
 
 ˆ
( )
   
kp w f
q
.                                            …(6) 
   
The threshold depends on the wage and the firing cost. Decrease in wage or increase in 
the firing cost reduces threshold pˆ . Note that the threshold is given after the wage has 
been specified and the effort cost has been sunk. An employee and a firm can consider 
threshold pˆ  upon being matched. A firm, therefore, minimizes the wage subject to 
constraint (4) and threshold (6) by using backward induction. 
 Threshold pˆ  must be positive to maintain an employee’s incentive, i.e., 
ˆ 0p  . If ˆ 0p   holds, an employee is never fired; thus, constraint (4) on incentives is 
never satisfied. The absence of the threat of dismissal motivates an employee to shirk. 
This is the common result of the efficiency wage model. 
  
6. Beveridge curve 
 Constraint (4) on incentives, the present discounted value of a firm’s profit 
given by (5), and the threshold of dismissal given by (6) specify search equilibrium 
( , )w . The job creation rate is ( )
1
uq
u
    and the job destruction rate is ˆ( )p . 
From the steady state condition in terms of job flow, the job creation rate should be 
equivalent to the job destruction rate. Thus, the equilibrium unemployment rate is given 
as the Beveridge curve by  
 
 
ˆ( )
ˆ( ) ( )
pu
p q
    .                                            …(7) 
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7. Search equilibrium 
 Although unstable equilibria can exist in my model, it is reasonable to focus on 
stable equilibria. In a match, it is assumed that the adjustment of the entry or exit of job 
vacancies in the market is slower than the wage adjustment. In addition, a firm is too 
small to influence market tightness  , and the firm minimizes the wage given market 
tightness, subject to constraint (4) on incentives. Constraint (4), therefore, is binding at 
all times, even if the economy is not in the search equilibrium. The locally stable 
condition of equilibria is given by 
 
 2
' 0w w
kqIC IC J
q 
  ,                                           ...(8) 
 
where ( )w
IC wIC
w
  , 
( )IC wIC
  , and w
JJ
w
 
 .  
The search equilibria are represented by the points of intersection in Figure 1.4 
The wage is adjusted more smoothly than the entry or exit of job vacancies; therefore, 
the economy is almost always on the IC curve of constraint (4). In Figure 1, point A on 
( )IC w c , which is near equilibrium E1, is below the JC curve of (5); hence, the 
expected profit of a job vacancy at point A is positive, causing more job vacancies in the 
market. The economy will be distant from equilibrium E1; therefore, equilibrium E1 is 
unstable, while equilibrium E2 is stable. Although I do not explicitly consider transition 
dynamics, my focus is limited to the equilibrium satisfying the locally stable condition 
(8).  
First, I consider how the change in the relative share of SP affects the economy 
given a constant level of firing cost, that is, f f . 
 
Proposition 1 
  Assume that the share of SP increases given a constant level f of the firing cost. 
Increase in the share of SP boosts the wage, the threshold of dismissal, and the 
unemployment rate. It also reduces the market tightness.  
 
 The proof is provided in the appendix. When the stringency of EP is fixed, that 
is, f f , a firm incurs the same firing cost f f  regardless of the share of SP. 
                                                  
4 The IC curve, constraint (4), may have a downward or upward slope. The slope of the IC curve is 
irrelevant to the result only if stable condition (8) holds. 
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Because a shirking employee is entitled to receive SP whenever he/she is fired, SP 
discourages an employee from delivering the required effort. A high wage offer is 
therefore necessary to maintain the employee’s incentives, which reduces the firm’s 
profit from the match. This is the disincentive effect, which causes firms with vacancies 
to exit the market, thereby reducing market tightness. 
 Because the total firing cost does not change, the JC curve of (5) does not shift. 
On the other hand, increase in the share of SP shifts the IC curve of constraint (4) 
upward, thereby increasing the wage and reducing market tightness (Figure 2a). 
Moreover, the job destruction rate depends on threshold pˆ , which is increased by 
increase in wage w and decrease in market tightness  . Therefore, the job destruction 
rate clearly increases, resulting in increase in the unemployment rate, as mentioned in 
(7). The Beveridge curve (7) shifts because of increase in the job destruction rate ˆ( )p , 
as shown in Figure 2b. In addition, the JC curve in Figure 2b shifts clockwise because 
of decrease in market tightness  . Increase in the share of SP, therefore, shifts the 
equilibrium from E1 to E2 (Figure 2b). Because market tightness decreases, the 
unemployment rate unambiguously increases.  
 In contrast, if the share of PI increases, the wage decreases and market 
tightness increases. In addition, the threshold of dismissal and the unemployment rate 
decline. 
  
 
3. Numerical Illustration 
 
 Proposition 1 holds only when the total firing cost is fixed. This situation, 
however, is restrictive. The total effect of the firing cost is ambiguous from the 
theoretical perspective; hence, I conduct a computer simulation on the search 
equilibrium.  
 The equilibrium is characterized by constraint (4) and the zero profit condition 
of vacancy (5) along with threshold (6). A baseline situation is given in Table 1. I 
consider the case in which productivity is uniquely distributed, that is, 
1 1( )
100
p
p
   . 
Furthermore, the productivity density function of a shirking employee is given by 
1( ) [0, 10]
10
S p for p    and ( ) 0 [10, 100]S p for p   . The distributions of 
the productivity of employees satisfy the first-order stochastic dominance. In the 
baseline situation, a unique search equilibrium exists.  
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 Figure 3a shows the curve of ( ) ( )S p p   in the simulation. The curve first 
increases, then decreases. Whether the curve increases or decreases is crucial for 
considering the effect of firing cost on incentives. When a high firing cost deters a firm 
from firing an employee, threshold pˆ  of dismissal decreases. The effect on incentives 
depends on the value of ˆ ˆ( ) ( )S p p  . If decrease in pˆ  lowers the value of 
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )S p p  , constraint (4) on the incentive of the employee will be tight; thus, the 
effect of firing cost on incentives is likely to be negative. In contrast, if decrease of pˆ  
caused by high firing cost increases the value of ˆ ˆ( ) ( )S p p  , the effect can be 
positive.  
 Figure 3b shows the curve of ˆ ˆ( ) ( )S p p   when the distribution functions 
are normal with the expectation values 1 and 0 and the common variances are equal to 1. 
The curve is smoother than, but is similar to, that of Figure 3a. Although the distribution 
functions in the baseline seem to be restrictive, the result of this simulation is not 
greatly influenced by the setting of the distribution functions.  
 
1. Wage and market tightness 
  
Proposition 2 
  In this simulation, the following points are considered:  
[1] As Figure 4 shows, the wage initially increases and then decreases with respect to s 
(SP), given a level of z (PI).  
[2] The influence of PI on the wage is not significant when SP is low. When SP is in the 
middle range, for example, s = 25, increase in PI lowers the incentive-compatible wage. 
[3] As Figure 5 shows, increase in SP decreases market tightness. 
[4] Increase in PI also results in decrease in market tightness when SP is either low or 
high. However, when SP is in the middle range, for example, approximately s = 25, PI 
may increase market tightness. However, if PI is excessively severe, for example, z = 12, 
market tightness is reduced. 
 
This implies that increase in SP damages an employee’s incentives when SP is low. As 
a result, increase in SP increases the wage required to maintain workers’ incentives. 
High SP leads to small market tightness, which results in a high cost of shirking 
behavior by employees. In this situation, decline of market tightness influences the 
worker’s incentive more than the wage. Therefore, as Figure 4 shows, the wage 
decreases after SP exceeds a particular level, approximately s = 23.  
 On the other hand, increase in PI positively affects the incentives of employees. 
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Because PI deters a firm from frequently firing employees, a diligent employee, the one 
who can be fired but who is less likely to be fired than a shirking one, benefits from the 
resultant high job security, and the low wage is sufficient to maintain the incentive in 
exchange for high job security. This is the positive commitment effect.  
 
2. Threshold of dismissal and unemployment rate 
   
Proposition 3 
In this simulation, the following points are considered:  
[1] As SP increases, as shown in Figure 6, initially an employee is more likely to be 
fired and then is less likely to be fired.  
[2] Increase in PI does not significantly affect the threshold of dismissal when SP is low. 
However, increase in PI reduces the threshold significantly when SP is high. 
[3] As Figure 7 shows, the unemployment rate tends to be increased by increase in SP, 
while the unemployment rate is decreased by a hike of SP when SP is in the middle 
range and PI is moderate. 
[4] Increase in PI reduces the unemployment rate when SP is in the middle range. 
   
From (7), the unemployment rate depends on market tightness and the threshold of 
dismissal. Because increase in SP decreases market tightness (Proposition 2 [3]), the 
unemployment rate increases when SP increases the threshold of dismissal. On the other 
hand, when SP is high, the threshold of dismissal reduces as SP increases. If this result 
dominates the reducing effect of market tightness, the unemployment rate decreases 
with respect to SP. In fact, at approximately s = 25 and z = 2 or z = 4, increase in SP 
reduces the unemployment rate. 
When SP is in the middle range, Propositions 2 [4] and 3 [2] indicate that as PI 
increases, market tightness improves and the threshold of dismissal decreases, resulting 
in reduction in the unemployment rate. The effect of PI in reducing the unemployment 
rate appears when PI is in the appropriate range. If PI is severe, for example, z = 12, the 
effect disappears; that is, severe PI causes increase in the unemployment rate. Moreover, 
when SP is low or high, the influence of PI on the unemployment rate is comparatively 
small. The positive effect of PI on the unemployment rate clearly appears when SP is 
appropriately given; thus an optimal balance exists between SP and PI. 
In this model, the equilibrium inflows to unemployment, which is equivalent to 
the outflows from unemployment at the equilibrium, is given by the likelihood of 
dismissal ˆ( )p . Figure 6 shows that increase in PI reduces the inflows to 
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unemployment. This indicates that PI has a negative effect on the reallocation of the 
labor force, which is similar to the results in the literature on EP. Consistent with the 
literature, the simulation shows that the speed of the inflows to and outflows from 
unemployment is not significantly associated with the unemployment rate.  
  
3. Social Welfare 
 As the same situation is repeated in every period on the equilibrium path, it is 
sufficient to consider the social welfare level in one period. Social welfare in one period 
is given by 
 
  ˆ ˆ( ) ( )( ) (1 )pp p p dp p w z c u uw k u          . 
 
Figure 8 shows the level of social welfare. 
 
Proposition 4 
  When SP is in the middle range, appropriate PI improves social welfare through the 
positive commitment effect. 
 
As shown in Figure 8, social welfare improves gradually with respect to SP 
when SP is low. Although the effect of SP seems to be positive, this positive effect on 
social welfare may be due to the elimination of the negative search externality. Thus, it 
can be inferred that social welfare improves if EP solves the search externality. 
I can infer the effect of the search externality on the basis of previous studies. 
When the bargaining power of an employee is weak compared to the elasticity of the 
matching function, as the Hosios (1990) condition shows, the unemployment rate is 
excessively low from the perspective of efficiency. In this case, social welfare improves 
if a policy or an institutional device increases the unemployment rate. In my model, the 
level of SP is relevant to the bargaining power of an employee because high SP 
increases the ex post rent E-U of an employee. High SP is relevant to the case in which 
an employee has a strong bargaining power in the textbook model. This implies that 
social welfare increases with respect to SP when SP is low, as shown in Figure 8. The 
effect of improving social welfare is attributed in part to the elimination of the negative 
search externality.  
In the textbook model of Pissarides (2000), the efficient level of bargaining 
power is uniquely determined by the Hosios condition. When the bargaining power of 
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an employee is very weak, as the bargaining power increases, social welfare improves 
initially and then declines. If the search externality is only crucial to social welfare, the 
social welfare curve should be mound shaped with respect to SP. In contrast, in my 
model, the social welfare curve is comparatively complex as shown in Figure 8. Thus, 
the result that PI improves social welfare in the middle range of SP is not caused by the 
effect of eliminating the search externality. 
   
4. Long-term shock 
 The discount rate in this numerical illustration is 0.0125, which indicates that 
the model uses quarterly periods. Even if the productivity of an employee is low, he/she 
is unlikely to be fired if the bad financial situation continues only for a quarter. By 
considering the vacancy cost, a firm would be inclined to retain an employee if the low 
productivity is expected for only a short period. In contrast, if the low productivity 
persists for a long time, the firm would be unwilling to retain the match, and thus the 
match is likely to be dissolved. 
 To examine the long-term low productivity situation, I implement a numerical 
illustration with a high discount rate. For example, consider the case of r = 0.1, which 
indicates that the low productivity situation continues for approximately 2-4 years. A 
high discount rate naturally increases the threshold of dismissal as well as the 
unemployment rate. However, in the middle range of SP, a more severe PI, z = 8, 
reduces the unemployment rate in the case of r = 0.1 to a greater extent than in the case 
of r = 0.0125. The difference in the unemployment rate between z = 8 and z = 4 is 
denoted as 8 4z zu u u     as shown in Figure 9a. To reduce the unemployment rate, 
PI is more effective in the case of r = 0.1 than in the case of r = 0.0125.  
 Similarly, the difference in social welfare 8 4z z      is represented in 
Figure 9b. The social-welfare-improving effect is larger in the case of r = 0.1 than in the 
case of r = 0.0125. Thus, the positive effect of PI is not necessarily smaller when low 
productivity persists for a long time. 
 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
  
I examined the efficiency wage model with matching technology to analyze the 
effects of EP on workers’ incentives. EP generates two effects: the disincentive effect 
and the commitment effect. If the latter dominates the former, EP improves social 
welfare. I also examined the differences between SP and PI. Although SP seems better 
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than PI from the perspective of social welfare, SP is an earning for shirking employees, 
and thus its effects on employee incentives may be negative compared with the effect of 
PI. 
 Similar to the results of previous studies regarding EP, my results on the effects 
of EP were theoretically ambiguous. I therefore conducted a computer simulation and 
obtained the following results: [1] SP tends to increase the unemployment rate. [2] PI 
does not have a significant effect on the economy when SP is low or high; however, 
when SP is in the middle range, it decreases the threshold of dismissal and the 
unemployment rate, improving social welfare. [3] Very severe PI negatively affects 
employee incentives. Therefore, it is necessary to design EP appropriately. 
In this model, increase in PI reduces the inflows to and outflows from 
unemployment. Consistent with the literature, the speed of the inflows to and outflows 
from unemployment is not significantly associated with the unemployment rate.  
 I have not considered workers’ bargaining power explicitly in this paper. 
Rocheteau (2001) focuses on incentives and the bargaining power of employees, 
concluding that a firm inflexibly sets the wage, similar to the efficiency wage model, 
when employees’ bargaining power is weak. If employees’ bargaining power is strong, 
the wage and the threshold of dismissal are determined through labor-management 
negotiations. Therefore, my model, in which firms control the wage and the threshold of 
dismissal, applies to the case of employees with weak bargaining power. However, this 
does not indicate that my model is irrelevant to the situation where employees’ 
bargaining power is strong. The degree of employment protection tends to be associated 
with employees’ bargaining power and industrial relationships. Stringent EP is relevant 
to bargaining power; thus, this study is not quite different from studies regarding EP and 
industrial relationship such as Belot and van Ours (2001) (2004) and Garibaldi and 
Violante (2005). 
I considered the case in which the wage is flexibly decided during the 
formation of employment contracts but is inflexible ex post. Empirically, the issue of 
the degree of wage flexibility has been controversial. Differences in views on 
macroeconomic policy often stem from differences in views regarding the extent to 
which the wage is flexibly adjusted. As Pissarides (2009) indicates, the wage of a new 
match relevant to the external wage of outsiders is comparatively flexible, but the 
continuous wage of an existing match is comparatively inflexible. As a result, the 
setting of the model is consistent with the real world. 
 Bewley (1999) conducted interviews with over 200 business people, including 
firm managers, lawyers, and consultants; Campbell and Kamlani (1997) conducted 
17 
 
investigations on firm managers. These studies suggest that wages are inflexible 
because a wage cut seriously damages motivation. Furthermore, according to behavioral 
science, some psychological factors deter firm managers from decreasing wages. A 
well-known psychological effect—the money illusion—makes wage declines less 
preferable than increases. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) and Agell and 
Bennmarker (2007) report that workers tend to prefer constant nominal wages with 
inflation over nominal wage decline without inflation, even if both result in identical 
amounts of real wages. In addition to these studies, experimental studies such as that by 
Fehr and Falk (1999) show wages to be inflexible in the case of excessive labor supply 
and involuntary unemployment. The experimental studies indicate that firm managers 
experience difficulty adjusting wages downward.5 Therefore, my setting in which the 
wage is flexibly decided during the formation of employment contracts but is inflexible 
ex post is not unrealistic.  
 
 
Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
  Because constraint (4) is binding at the equilibrium, ( ) 0w
IC wIC
w
   holds at the 
equilibrium. The proof is as follows. Assume that 0wIC  . In this situation, a firm can 
reduce the wage further provided constraint (4) is satisfied, thus increasing the firm’s 
profit. This contradicts the notion that the original wage maximizes the firm’s profit. 
Hence, at the equilibrium 0wIC   holds.  
 Next, I conduct comparative statics regarding the search equilibrium with 
respect to s subject to 0df ds dz   , as follows:   
 
                                                  
5 Recently, the relationship between wage rigidity and the matching model has been a widely 
discussed issue. Shimer (2005) indicates that the Mortensen–Pissarides matching model can hardly 
explain the volatility of unemployment and vacancies; Hall (2005) shows that introducing wage 
rigidity in the model improves its suitability.  
   While Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) and Pissarides (2009) mention that wage rigidity improves 
the model’s power of explanation, they argue that the model does not require wage rigidity. 
According to them, the power of explanation improves if other factors such as hiring or firing costs, 
demand shocks, and on-the-job search behavior are considered in the typical model. In addition, as 
Kennan (2010), Moen and Roser (2007), and Brugemann and Moscarini (2007) analyze the issue, 
asymmetric information, such as adverse selection and moral hazard, magnifies the volatility in 
unemployment and vacancies.  
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

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 
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where 
( ) ( ) ˆ ˆ{ ( ) ( )} 0
ˆ( ) ( )
S
s S
IC w r qIC p p
s r q p
            and 0s
JJ
s
 
 . 
Using the locally stable condition (8) and 
ˆ1 ( ) 0
ˆ( )w
pJ
r p
  
 ,  
2
2
'
/ 1
'/
s
w w w s
kq ICdw ds
q
kqd ds IC IC J J ICq 
              
 holds. 
 
Hence, 0
f f
dw
ds 
  and 0
f f
d
ds 
  . The results lead to ˆ 0
f f
dp
ds 
  from (6), and 
thus, it holds from (7) that 0
f f
du
ds 
 .■ 
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Figure 1 
Equilibrium E1 is unstable but E2 is stable. 
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Figure 2a  
Search equilibrium 
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Search equilibrium  
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Figure 3a 
The curve of ( ) ( )S p p   in the base line case 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3b 
The curve of ( ) ( )S p p   in the normal distribution case 
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Figure 4: Wage 
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Figure 5: Market Tightness 
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Figure 6: Threshold of Dismissal 
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Figure 7: Unemployment Rate 
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Figure 8: Welfare 
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Figure 9a 
Effect of long-term shock on the unemployment rate 
 
 
 
Figure 9b 
Effect of long-term shock on social welfare 
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Table 1 
Values of Parameters 
 
Parameters Values 
range of state   [0, 100]p  
density function of diligent 
workers 
  1( ) 0, 100
100
p for p     
density function of shirking 
workers 
 
 
1 0, 10
( ) 10
0 10, 100
S for pp
for p
    
 
reservation wage  10w   
interest rate  0.0125r   
effort cost  25c   
vacancy cost  k = 5 
matching function  0.50.7( )m uv  
 
 
 
 
 
